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The ''worker'', the Labour Court and the 
common law in New Zealand: a holy 
trinity? 
* Isaacus K. Adzoxornu 
The primary purpose of this article is 2 fold: firstly, to argue that not only have 
industrial tribunals in New Zealand incorrectly interpreted the statutory term 
"worker", but also that in doing so, they have assumed a juri.JJdiction which has never 
been conferred on them by statute; and secondly, to make some suggestions towards 
reform of Labour Court practice in this crucial area. 
1. Introduction 
Perhaps the most crucial condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction by the 
current New Zealand Labour Court is that the issue(s) before it must relate to, or affect, 
the interest(s) or conduct of a "worker" or a coll~tivity of "workers". "Worker" is a 
statutory term defined with minor variations in enactments including the Labour 
Relations Act 1987, (referred to in this article as "the LR Act" or "the Act") which confer 
jurisdiction on the Labour Court In spite of the liberal definitions of the term "worker", 
the Labour Court and its predecessors have decided for reasons which are by no means 
clear, to limit the meaning of the term to the common law understanding of "servant" or 
"employee". One may object to this approach not only on the ground that it is contrary 
to certain long-observed rules of statutory construction, but aJso because of certain socio-
legal developments which have so far characterised the exercise of jurisdiction by 
industrial tribunals in New Zealand. 
Before going further, it is important to know that the current meaning has had a 
negative consequence for the size of the working population which has actually benefited 
from the jurisdiction of these tribunals. Instead of augmenting, the current meaning has 
diminished this size. If the policy behind modem industrial dispute legislation such as 
the LR Act can be said to be contrary to this development, then it is suggested that a 
serious problem exists in modem New Zealand regarding the current meaning of the term 
"worker". 
In New Zealand, as in other countries, an institutional specialization in industrial 
relations and law is developing. Our age is witness to an increasing arrogation to 
industrial tribunals (at the present time, the Labour Court), of the competence to 
determine industrial relations issues, to either the total or partial exclusion of other 
tribunals in modem society. While the course of this development is yet to be charted 
fully in the academic literature, (Vranken and Hince, 1988, pp.112-113) it is clear that it 
is a product of certain recent legislative and judicial rationalisation. Recent legislative 
changes have effected, in particular, the abolition of certain well-entrenched industrial 
• Lecturer in Law, Victoria University of Wellington. I would like to thank Don Mathieson, 
Gordon Anderson and Anthony Shaw for their useful comments on the original draft of this 
article. 
62 lsaacus Adzoxornu 
relations institutions, amongst which the Aircrew Industry Tribunal, the Agricultural 
Tribunal and the Waterfront Industry Tribunal are perhaps the most prominent (Szakats, 
1980; 1989, pp.22-24 ). The consequence of this has been an unprecedented and 
accelerated expansion of the jurisdiction of the current Labour Coun (Szakats, 1988, 
pp.311-314). Also , some recent decisions of the higher courts have accentuated and 
accelerated the rate of institutional specialisation in industrial relations and law. In NZ 
Baking Trades Employees Industrial Union v General Foods Corporation (NZ) Ltd, 
([1985] 2 NZLR 110) and NZ Labourers' Union v Fletcher Challenge Ltd, ([1988] 1 
NZLR 520), the Court of Appeal decided that although the regular courts and industrial 
tribunals may exercise certain concurrent jurisdictions, in a proceeding or cause in which 
there is a "serious" industrial issue to be tried, it will best serve the public interest if the 
regular courts abdicate their jurisdiction 1n order to enable an industrial tribunal to try the 
issue in at least the firs t instance (sec also Elgin v Newman , High Court, 1989, CP 
770/88). In Auckland Shop Employees Union v Woolworths (NZ) Ltd ([1985] 2 NZLR 
372), and Marshall Cordner & Co v Canterbury Clerical Workers Union ([1986] 2 NZLR 
43 1), not only did the Court of Appeal refrain from formulating certain implied terms in 
the contracts of employment in issue, it was also content to arrogate this responsibility 
to the then Arbitration Court to be exercised in appropriate cases. 
What both legislative innovations and judicial pronouncements seem to have achieved 
in recent times is to recognise the current Labour Co urt, in particular, as the most 
competent institution in modem society to decide industrial law issues. The question, 
"who is a worker?" 1s essentially a question of industrial law , and as such the Labour 
Court is the most qual1ficd institution in modem society to decide it. If, therefore, there 
is today, as we strongly s uggest, a cri sis in the meaning assigned to this fundamental 
concept of modem industrial law - the "worker" - by the Labour Court, it is of the most 
profo und consequence for a significant sec tion of New Zealand indus trial law and 
relations. This alone will justify any effort to drag this issue out of the Labour Court 
room into the public arena for a wider consideration than is the case now. 
2. Dressing the "worker" in the garb of the "servant" 
Industrial tribunals and the literal rule of statutory construction 
Il is surprising to see how quickl y our industrial tribunals' acceptance of tried and 
trusted canons of s t.atutory interpretation evaporate into thin air when they arc called upon 
to interpret the statJtory term "worker". In New Zealand, courts have accepted the literal 
or plain mcan1ng rule as the "elementary and fundamental pnnc iple" of statutory 
construction 1. That the Labour Court and its predecessors have also accepted this rule is 
now beyond all reasonable doubt (sec e.g. Auckland 1/otel , 1/ospital , etc. IUW v Air NZ 
Llt [1986] ACJ 2 18, 222). Judge Palmer of the Labour Cour~ recently summarised the 
Labour Court's position in the followmg words: 
1 As Dav ison CJ, observed in 1/iggs v Vibrapac Masonry (Wellington) Ltd Unreported, H igh 
Court , Wellington, M 100/82, 6 Augus t 1982, "IL 1s an e lem entary and fundamental 
pr inc iple tha t t.he obJeC t of the court , in interpre ting a s tatute, ' is to see what is t.he 
in tention expressed by the words' .. . It 1s only by conside r ing the m eaning o f the words 
used by the legi«)lature that the cou rt can ascerta in i ts mtention. And it is no t unduly 
pedantiC to beg m wt th the assump tion that words mean what they say .. . " See, also, 
McClenaghan v BNL [ 1978] 2 NZLR 529 
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It is. of course. a fundamental ... precept of construction of the provisions of a 
statute or instrument that the intention of the provision/s in contention should 
be discerned from their plain ordinary meaning. It is trite to comment in this 
setting that 'It is not unduly pedantic to begin with the assumption that words 
mean what they say' ... (NZ Public Service Asscn (Inc) v SSC 1989. CLC 
52/89).2 
The learned judge on this occasion applied the plain meaning rule as he did in 2 other 
decisions (1989, CLC 37/89; 1989, CLC 53/89). 
However, there are recognised considerations which will justify a departure from the 
plain or ordinary meaning approach to statutory construction. In Post Office Union (Inc) 
v NZ Post Ltd (1989, CLC 5/89) Judge Palmer of the Labour Court "re-emphasized" that 
the plain or ordinary words approach is not an "absolute" rule of statutory construction. 
He held that a court will refuse to apply it when in its view the result would lead to an 
absurdity or irrationality, for instance. Thus in Auckland 1/otel, etc, IUW v Air NZ Ltd 
([1986] ACJ 218), Judge Williamson declined to apply the rule after he came to the 
conclusion that its result would be "so irrational that it [was] unlikely to have been the 
intention of the negotiating parties" (p.222). Instead, the learned judge decided to apply 
the so-called "mischief" rule. He asked and attempted an answer to the question: "what 
mischief was the clause intended to remedy?" Judge Williamson's approach in the latter 
case represents the well-treasured rule that the plain or ordinary word approach must be 
observed unless there exists an obviously necessary reason to depart from the words of an 
Act 
It is against this background that we shall argue Lhat whenever Parliament has chosen 
the term 11 WOrker" as opposed to the term "employee") it has defined the former broadly to 
include a limitless category of working people. Statutory definitions of "worker" mean 
what they say. They have not sought to limit the identity of the "worker" to a person 
who is engaged for work under a contract of service. 
Statutory de fin it ions of "worker" 
The thesis that "worker" is broadly defined in New Zealand sta tutes is supported by 
the definitions proffered in Section 2 of both the Minimum Wage Act 1983, and the 
Wages Protection Act 1983, for example. According to the former: 
'Worker'-
(a) Means any person of any age employed by an employer to do any work 
for hire or reward; and 
(b) Includes a homeworker. 
The Wages Protection Act's version is: 
'Worker', means any person in any manner employed in any service or work for 
wages, and. in relation to any employer, means any worker employed by that 
employer. 
None of these definitions has sought to limit the meaning of the term to any contractual 
classification of a person's work. 
The defin~tion of "bush worker" is similarly broad. It means "any person engaged, 
whether on his own account as a contractor, or as an employee in a bush undertaking" 
(s2(1), Bush Workers Act 1945). The inclusion in this definition of the word "employee" 
has not placed any limitation on the meaning of the term for 2 main reasons. First, it is 
2 Unreported Labour Court decisions bear either a CLC or WLC reference. 
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clear that the definition embraces both the common law "independent contractor" and 
"employee" . Second, as we shall argue below, whenever statute uses the term 
"employee", as opposed to "worker", it has defined the former in terms of a contract of 
• 
service. 
The Holidays Act 1981 has also chosen liberal words to define the term for its own 
purposes. "Worker" in section 2(1) of the Act means: 
Any person of any age of ei ther sex employed by any employer to do any work 
for hire or reward; and includes an apprentice and any o ther person whose 
contract of employment requires him to learn or to be taught any occupation ... 
From this definition, it is clear that the meaning of the term "worker" is unfettered by 
any ambiguous words; rather it extends, wherever possible , to include an apprentice or 
any other person whose contract requires him or her to learn a trade or an occupation (see 
section 2, Agric ultural Workers Act 1977). 
Some repealed statu tes went further than this to provide an extended definition of the 
term . The purpose of such an extended definition was to expressly expand, rather than to 
restrict, the categories of persons that may be regarded as "workers". For example , "in 
order to remove any doubt" as to the meaning of the term, section 2(3) of both the 
Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1954 (hereafter referred to as the IC&A Ac t), 
and the Industrial Relations Act 1973 (hereafter referred to as the IR Act), expressly went 
on to state that the term applied regardless of whe ther a re lationship was that of "master 
and servant" or "em pi oyer and employee". The current Holidays Act 198 1 has continued 
this tradi tion by providing in its sec tion 2(3) that 
For the purposes of the defini tion of the term "worker" in sub-section (1) of this 
section, every person who is wholly or m ainly engaged in procuring proposals 
or contracts of industrial life assurance or in collecting industrial life assurance 
premiums for any person, firm, company, socie ty, association, or corporation 
carrying on industrial life assurance business and is remunerated wholly or 
partly by fees or commission shall be deemed to be a worker employed by that 
person, firm, company, society, association, or corporation, whe ther or not the 
relationship between them is that of master and servant 
This ex tended defini tion also has not limited the meaning of "worker" to a person 
engaged under a contrac t of employment or service, or who is engaged as a "servant" or 
"employee". Il would appear, therefore, from the plain or ordinary meanings of the 
statutory definitions examined so far that the s tatutory concept of "worker" is much 
broader than the common law servant or "employee". 
The most proximate New Zealand legislation under which the Labour Court exerc ises 
its specialist j uri sdiction is the LR Act. This Act, like its predecessors the IC&A Act 
and the IR Ac t, has defined the term "worker" very liberall y. Under sec tion 2(1) of the 
LR Act, "worker" 
(a) Means any person of any age employed by an employer to do 
any work for hire or reward; and 
(b) Includes -
(i) A homeworker; or 
(ii) A person intending to work. 
Unlike its predecessors, the LR Act has not given the term any extended definition. 
As we have already observed, the extended definitions provided in the predecessor Acts 
expressly included in the meaning of "worker" relationships outside those of the common 
law "master and servant" or "employer and employee". A case may therefore be made that 
the absence of an extended defin ition of the term in the LR Act may convey the intention 
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of Parliament to limit the meaning of the term to the common law concept of a "servant" 
or "employee". However, this argument can only be sustained if the plain or ordinary 
meanings of the words of the statute have failed to indicate the real intention of 
Parliament. It would appear that the words of the statute arc clear enough to bring out 
the parliamentary intent. 
In spite of the absence of an extended definition of the term "worker", the LR Act is 
innovative in two respects. First, it has defined the term to include "a homeworker". To 
belong to this category, a person must be: 
engaged, employed or contracted by any other person (in the course of that 
other person's trade or business) to do work for that other person in a dwelling 
house (not being work on that dwelling house or on fixtures, fittings or 
furniture in it); and includes a person who is in substance so engaged, employed, 
or contracted notwithstanding that the form of the contract between the parties 
is technically that of vendor and purchaser (Section 2( 1 ). 
The inclusion of "homeworker" in the definition of "worker" expands, rather than 
contracts the categories of those who may be regarded as workers for the purposes of the 
AcL 
The second innovation introduced by the LR Act is the inclusion in the definition of 
the term "a person intending to work". Before the LR Act came into operation, the 
Labour Court and its predecessors limited the meaning of the term to persons who were 
in "actual employment." Because of this, access to the tribunals was denied persons 
whose contracts of employment were terminated before they could actually commence 
work (Wilson [1980] ACJ 357; Raeburn [1984] ACJ 757; Jackson v ([1987] NZILR 
883). Judge Goddard (as he then was) of the Labour Court, had the occasion in the Elms 
Mother Lodge Ltd. case (1989, WLC 59/89) to rule on the new definition when he held 
that: 
It would be quite wrong. in view of lhe altered definition in the statute, for this 
court to continue to countenance a situation under which an employer could 
resile with impunity. so far as personal grievance remedies are concerned, from 
a concluded contract of employment, on the sole ground that the performance of 
the contract has not yet commenced. The law should not work in a capricious 
fashion. There IS obviously a defect in the earlier statutory position which has 
now been cured by Parliament, and deli bcrately so. 
Insofar as this decision has sought to recognise the expanded meaning of the term 
"worker", it is commendable. 
The contrast in the definition of "employee: 
It would be difficult to sustain from the statutory definitions of "worker" examined so 
far that Parliament intended the term to reflect a movement away from the socially 
unacceptable and discredited expression "servant". It has been suggested in some sections 
of the academic literature that because the terms "master" and "servant" carry 
undemocratic and slavery connotations, it seems more appropriate to replace them with 
"employer" and "employee" (Szakats, 1988. pp.3,9; Mathieson, 1970, p.1 ). This switch 
in terminology will not, however, affect the common law test of an employer and 
employee relationship; which is a determination that a person worked or works under a 
contractofsennce. r 
It is important to note that the definitions examined so far are concerned with the 
"worker", not the "employee". It cannot be argued that Parliament lacked the 
sophistication to distinguish between the 2 terms. Not only has Parliament, in some 
66 Isaac us Adzoxorn u 
other statutes, clearly preferred the term "employee" to "worker", but whenever it has 
preferred the former term, it has been consistent enough to limit its definition .to a person 
who works under a contract of service, as opposed to a contract for servtces. Two 
examples will suffice here. Section 2 of the Accident Compensation Act defines 
"employee" in part as "any person who has engaged to work or works ... under a contract 
of service or apprenticeship". In the Equal Pay Act 1972, an "employee" is: 
[A]ny person who has entered into or works under a contract of service or 
apprenticeship with an employer , whether by way of manual labour, clerical 
work, or any o ther work or effort whatsoever .. . 
These definiuons are consistent with Court of Appeal authority in the NZ Educational 
Institute case ([1 98 1] 1 NZLR 538) that in order to determine who is an employee, the 
test to apply is whether or not the person works or worked under a contract of service. 
Industrial tribunals and the meaning of "worker" 
We have already demonstrated that the Labour Court and its predecessors have accepted 
the policy position that words in a statute should be given their ordinary meaning unless 
this would lead to absurdity, injustice, irrati onality, hardship, etc., or would be 
inconsis tent with the intention of Parliament. It would also appear, from at least Judge 
Goddard's dec ision in the Elms Motor Lodge case, that the LR Act has used "clear words" 
to define the term "worker". It wo uld follow log ically from these considerations, 
therefore, that industrial tribunals should , at least initially , derive the meaning of the 
term from the plain meaning of t.he words. This, however, has not been the case . In the 
case of ]arden, Judge Thompson of the Court of Arbitration held that: 
The appellant to succeed in her aclion mus t be a "worker" under the ... Act .. . . 
"worker" is defined as any person ... employed by any employer to do any work 
for h1rc or reward. Mr Fmlay [for the appellant] conceded that a person to be a 
worker must be a party to a contrac t of employment and we th ink that this 
conces<:ion was nghtly made ... (f 1970] BA 4982). 
It is not in the least clear from the definition quoted by the learned judge how the 
nollon of a "conLract o f e mployment" found its way into that definition. Althoug h 
judges of New Zealand indusLria l tri bunals have stated the problem differently in the 
cases, the effect has remained the same: that is, in order to determine whe ther a person is, 
or was a worker the relevant question is whether the person works or worked under a 
contract of service, as opposed to a contractfor services, or, whether there was between 
the parties a m~ter and servant relattonshJp , or an employer and employee relationship 
(sec, e.g., the Dyer [1980] ACJ 29 1; Uncle's Foodbar [1981] ACJ 57 1; and Tony Chimes 
[ 1 986] ACJ 387, cases). The overall purpose of thi s exercise has been to exclude from 
the benefit of the tribunals' jurisdic tions, persons who work or worked under contracts for 
services, or as independent contractors. 
There is no j udgement on record in which either the present Labour Court or any of 
Its predecessors has purposively explored the possibdtty, tf not the desirability, o f intro-
ducing a divergence in the meanings of the s t.atutory "worker", and the common law 
"servant" or "employee". Instead, they have all proceded on the bas is that the terms mean 
one and the same thing . According to S1akats ( 1988, p .2 1) the word "hire" in the 
de fintllon "suggests a narrow construcllon exc ludtng independent contractors ." This v1cw 
is hardly defensible 
There ts only one deciston tn which the attempt was made to cons1der t.he meaning of 
the words "hire or reward ''. The unusual facts of the ]arden case ([ 1970] BA 4982) which 
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made this possible were that Mrs Lipsham (the appellant), worked as a telephonist for the 
respondent's taxi business, in consideration of her husband being given some shares in 
the business after the respondent had acquired and paid for 3 more taxis. The appellant's 
husband was at the time the only driver and manager of the business. Her husband was 
dismissed before he could acquire any shares in the business. An action was brought on 
behalf of Mrs Lipsham for unpaid wages under the relevant award. 
Judge Thompson of the Court of Arbitration held that there was no enforceable 
contract of employment between Mrs Lipsham and the respondent. Rather it was a 
condition of Mr Lipsham's contract of employment that Mrs Lipsham should attend to 
the telephone; and that the performance of this duty was a domestic arrangement between 
the Lipshams, which could not be enforced against the respondent. Mrs Lipsham was 
not, therefore, in the ordinary usc of language, employed for "hire". 1 udgc Thompson 
went on to hold that to be employed as a "worker" under the IC&A Act, a person must be 
engaged or employed for "hire or reward ". According to His Honour, these words 
suggested consideration in the form of money, or something which could be readily 
translated into money. Furthermore, this monetary consideration must be payable to the 
employee and not to a third party. His Honour was prepared to hold so although he 
observed that a valid contract could assign benefiLS under it to a third party. He, however, 
held that "we are [here] not concerned with contraclS generally but with the question 
whether a contract of this type can create the status of "worker" in a person who herself 
takes no benefit". According to His Honour, injustice would arise if the general 
principles of contract law were extended to employment contracts under the Act. For 
present purposes, one other remark made obiter by His Honour, which was totally 
inconsistent with the main decision in the case, requires our attention. He said at one 
stage that 
[T]here may be a contract of service creating the relationship of master and 
servant which does not create the relationship of "employer" and "worker" under 
the Act. This is not an unreasonable conclusion (p.4985). 
If His Honour's conclusion in this respect is correct in law, then there is support for 
the view that the term "worker" under the Act is not synonymous with the term "servant" 
or "employee". "Worker" under the Act may include, but it is by no means confined to, 
the common law "servant" or "employee''. This will be so even if the words "hire" and 
"reward" arc construed to mean monetary consideration for work payable only to the 
person engaged to work. 
It is not the contention of this article that the term "worker" is not capable of being 
construed as a person employed under a contract of service. It is rather that there is 
nothing in the LR Act in particular to justify the narrower construction which New 
Zealand industrial tribunals have placed on the term. There may exist some policy 
considerations which justify the narrower construction of the term. However, it is 
regrettable to observe that our industrial tribunals have not spclt these out. It is desirable 
in the face of the liberal definition of the term that any decision of the courts to limit the 
term to the common law servant must be supported by some sort of explanation. So far, 
our industrial tribunals have not explained to us why "any person of any age employed by 
an employer to do any work for hire or reward" should mean "any person employed under 
a contract of service". Such an explanation is needed urgently in order to convince son1e 
working people why Parliament has excluded them from the enjoyment of certain rights 
and protection provided under modern labour protection legislation such as the LR Act. 
Such an explanation will also bring the procedures and practices of our industrial tri-
bunals closer to those normally applied by courts of justice in the interpretation of 
statutory provisions. 
. If the view that the Labour Court and its predecessors have for all these years 
Incorrectly construed the statutory term "worker" is sustainable, then it will be difficult 
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to understand why some academic writers have given their tacit recognition, if not accep-
tance, to this practice (Geare, 1988, pp.65-74; Brooks, 1978, pp.l72-174). Although 
Mathieson has hit the nail on the head when he notes that there is virtually no authority 
in New Zealand law for the fundamental proposition that "a man or woman not working 
under what the common law would recognise as a contract of service is not a "worker" for 
the purposes of [the statutory] definition", he nevertheless comes to the conclusion that 
the proposition is implicit in New Zealand law (Mathieson, 1970, p.3) . 
What these wrilCrs have succeeded in doing is to condone the confusion which our 
industrial tribunals have created between the s tatutory "worker" and the common law 
"employee". This academic condonation of a statutory construction which is patently 
incorrect is Inconsis tent with the views expressed by overseas writers about the under-
standing of the modem day "worker" in jurisdic tions such as Australia (Merrit, 1982, 
p .59) and England (R1deout, 1983, pp.l6-17 ; Elias et . al, 1980, p .337; Hepple and 
O'Higgins, 1989, pp. l -42). 
3. Policy considerations and the construction of "worker" 
As In timated tn the preceding section, judicial ingenuity has succeeded in indicating 
the limits of the application of the plain or ordinary meaning rule of s tatutory construc-
uon. There is the we ll -recognised position that some instances will justify a departure 
from this rule. One of the residual rules o f statutory construction is what is known in 
both the judicial and academic j urisprudence as the "mischief" rule , or the rule in 
1/eydon's case ((1854) 3 Co Rep 7a). We have already seen an application of this rule in 
Auckland 1/otel, etc. , IUH' v Air NZ Ltd. ([1986] ACJ 218). BrieOy, what the rule 
demands o f the court is for the latter to go behind the ordinary words of the s tatute in 
order to discover the "mischief ' which the Act of Parliament soug ht to remedy . It 
requires a search for parliamentary intent through an investigation of the object of the Act 
of Parl!ament. The rule proceeds on the assumption that every Act of Parliament was 
purposively inLroduccd to rec tify an undesirable social s tate of affairs; that is, all Acts of 
Parliament arc remedial in one way or the o ther. After the object or objects of the Act 
has or have been discovered , the court is then required to construe the provisions of the 
Act so as to s uppress the mischief and/or advance the remedy. The Acts Interpretation 
Ac t 1924 of New Zealand has codt fied this rule in its sec tion 5U) in the following tenns: 
Every Act, and every provis ion or enac tment thereof, shall be deemed remedial, 
whe ther its immediate purport is to di rec t the doin g o f anything Parli ament 
deems to be for the public good, or to preven t or pun ish the domg of anything it 
deems con trary to the public good, and shall accordingly recei ve such fair, large 
and l iberal construction and interpretation as will best ensure the attainment of 
the obJeCt of the Act and of such provision or enactment according to its true 
intent, meaning and spirit 
Thus, in 1/ellaby Shortland Ltd v Weir ([ 1976] 2 NZLR 355), a very strong Court of 
Appeal held that Since the Fac ton es Act 1946 was inLroduced for the protec tion and 
benefit of fac tory workers, Parliament was, therefore, more like ly to have intended the 
more generous construction of its provistons from the point of view of workers. 
The major thesis to be arg ued in thi s sec tion of the paper is that aside from the 
legitimate observation that 1ndustnal tribunals in New Zealand have dec ided to read into 
the defini tjon of "worker" words whtch c learly do not ex is t, they have also failed, 
regrettably, to a11ow the rationale behind the LR Act, in particular, to innucnce the 
meaning of the term. 
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The "mischief" behind modern New Zealand protective labour 
legislation 
Opinion is divided amongst commentators on the question of whether the IR Act 
made any changes to its predecessors, the IC&A Acts. While writers such as Seidman 
(1984) were prepared to observe that theIR Act was "the first major revision" since 1894, 
others such as Woods (1974) and Gcare (1976), were of the view that the Act was nothing 
but a rehash of the previous Acts. However, in another context, Gcare (1988) was of the 
opinion that the 1987 LR Act represented "at the very least a significant improvement 
over the past legislation". W c shall avoid taking sides in this debate. The primary 
concern in this section is to determine the extent (if any) to which either stability or 
change in the rationale for modem industrial legislation has particular consequences for 
the definition, if not the meaning, of the term "worker" in the LR Act. 
"Individual" labour legislation 
Before the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1894, there were some pieces of 
legislation which recognised or protected the "individual" but not the "collective" interests 
of workers. Among these were the Master and Apprentice Act 1865 (No 45); 
Contractors' Debt Act 1871 (No L); Employment of Females Act 1873 (No LXXI); 
Employers' Liability Act 1882 (No 20); Truck Act 1891 (No 11); Coal Mines Act 1891 
(No 46); and Workmen's Wages Act 1893 (No 52). 
Even in those early years, New Zealand legislation avoided the use of the term 
"servant", preferring instead the term "workman". There was no uniform definition of 
this term) although 2 contrasting definitions were dominant. Section 2 of the Truck Act 
1891, typified the first. A 11 Workman" was: 
any person in any manner employed in work of any kind or in manual labour, 
whether under the age of twenty-one years or above that age. 
The second type of definition appeared in the Employers' Liability Act 1882, New 
Zealand's fust industrial accident compensation legislation. This Act limited the meaning 
of the term to persons employed under a "contract of service or contract personally to 
execute any work or labour". The Em players' Liability Act was the only exception; the 
others merely required that a person be employed either "in any manner'' or "in work of 
any kind". The Employers' Liability Act carried this definition through to 1982. The 
preferred term in the Accident Compensation Act 1982 is "employee"; however, the 
requirement that a person be employed under a It contract of service'' has remained. 
Distinctive characteristics of Workers' Compensation legislation 
Why did the legislature limit the meaning of the term in the Employers' Liability Act 
1882 to a contract of service, but expand it in the other laws? The explanation is not 
hard to find. It lay in the earlier common law's preparedness to understand the master and 
servant relationship in terms of a domestic arrangement (see e.g., Blackstone, 1978, 
p.422; Kahn-Freund, 1977) and also, in the rights and duties which this scheme of things 
imposed on the parties (Selznick, 1983, Chap 4). 
Certain incidents flowed from this earlier master and servant relationship. The master 
enjoyed the right to chastise the servant (Blackstone, 1978, p.426). The master had the 
right to command the servant, and the servant to obey. The contract could be specifically 
enforced and the servant was liable to be punished if he or she left the employment 
prematurely. The master also had a proprietary interest in the servant's services 
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(Blackstone, 1978, p.429). In return for all these, the master was under a legal duty to 
ensure the moral and phystcal well-being of the servant (Selznick, 1983, pp.128-129). 
The master was under a duty to provide the servant with medical, surgical and nursing 
treatment if the servant became ill or injured in the course of employment (Morris, 1946, 
p.18; Schouler, 1870, pp.616-618). As a general rule, the master could not discharge a 
servant for an incurable illness, and in some jurisdictions, the law penalized a master who 
turned away a servant who had not completely recovered from illness. Selznick suggests 
that this obligation of the master derived from the common law right of the master to 
chastise the servant or apprentice. He also suggests that this common law obligation 
applied where the relationship between the master and servant was "more intimate", 
"more endunng", or "close and lasting" ( 1983, pp.l28, 129). 
What is not clear from the authorities is whether the master's responsibility for the 
general welfare of the servant embraced also a duty to compensate the servant for injury 
sustained by the latter in the course of the employment. It would appear this was not the 
case in England, although there was a limited legal enforcement of such an obligation 
under one 1846 Act (9 & 10 V tct.). The operation of this law was limited because it was 
restricted to compensation for "persons killed" through a "wrongful act, neglect or 
default" of the "wrong-doer". Dissatisfaction with this law led to the introduction in 
1880 of the Employers' Liability Act (Cap 42, 43 & 44 Viet.), which sought to make 
payment of compensation to injured servants or dependants of servants killed in the 
course of their employment compulsory, because it was the "magnanimity and liberality" 
of employer<;, rather than any enforceable legal obligauon, which underwrote the whole 
gamut of industrial accidenLc; compensation at the time (NZ Parliamentary Debates, 1882, 
p.338). 
Thts was one of the m1schiefs whtch the New Zealand Employers' Liability Act 1882 
sought to remedy; that is, to make the payment of compensation for industrial accidents 
compulsory on the part of employers. It also sought to abolish the doctrine of common 
employment- "that repulsive law, one so conLrary to every feeling of natural justicell (NZ 
Parliamentary Debates 1882, p.339), and to limtt the amount of compensation to be paid 
to the sum which the servant would have earned in 3 years. 
The New Zealand legislation followed closely the English Act of 1880. Because 
compensation for injury or accidents suffered by servants in the course of their employ-
ment could not be divorced from the old common law obligation of the master to care for 
the servant tn both sickness and health, the law became applicable to a strict construction 
of a master and servant relationship. lL therefore became imperative for legislators in 
both England and New Zealand to create the "workman" in the image of the "servant" 
(Cap 90 38 & 39 Viet.). The res Lric tion of indusLrial injury compensation to the 
"servant" in modem legi<;lalion ts, therefore, historically informed. If this explanation is 
tenable, then the vtew that indusLrial injunes compensation is limited to "servants" or 
"employees" because "it would be impossible to detect abuse or fraud where a person was 
self-employed" would be largely discredited (Cane, 1987, p.327). The better view would 
be that no such duty was owed to the self-employed at common law. 
Lcgtslauon provtding for compensation for industrial acctdenLS may be differentiated 
from some other protecuve labour legtslalion in order to advance the understanding that in 
the Iauer cla\s of legislalton, the nature of protection and the recipient of this, arc likely 
to vary and embrace categories other than the "servant" or "employee". The Wages 
Protccuon Act 1983 (or 1ts historical ancestors the Truck Act 1891 and the Workmen's 
Wages Act 1893) IS primarily concerned with the wages whjch the worker has earned. 
The policy justiftcatton of wages protection leg t ~lation IS to recognise and enforce the 
propnetary Interest of a person 1n his or her wages. A person has a proprietary interest in 
his or her wages not nccessan I y because he or she has been employed as a servant or 
employee, but matnly because the wages have been earned by the person as a result of 
having been engaged for work (Blackstone, 1978, p.428). The law's role in thi s respect, 
therefore, ts to enforce a contractual promtse by an employer to pay a worker certain 
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wages in consideration of work done by the latter. In enforcing this contractual promise, 
the law has found it appropriate on certain occasions to also fix, not only the minimum 
rates to be paid for different kinds of labour services, but also the mode and periodicity of 
their payment. Thus, it can be seen that the law's role in the area of wages protection is 
likely to transverse the narrow interest of the "servant" or "employee" properly so-called, 
to encompass also other persons engaged to work for hire or reward under a variety of 
contractual arrangements. 
From "individual" to "collective" labour protection. 
New Zealand's first collective labour legis lation was the IC&A Act. We shall here 
rely substantially on the available research in order to provide some understanding of the 
policy considerations which informed the introduction of the first law. Writers are not 
unanimous on the question of whether or not the law has gone through any major 
changes since its introduction in 1894. However, one observation with which most 
writers will not disagree is this: whether or not the intent behind the first collective 
labour legislation was to eliminate "sweating",3 to encourage trade unionism (or even to 
create unionism) or to regulate wages (Vrankcn and Hincc, 1988, pp.108-113), these 
cannot be regarded as ends in themselves. Rather, whether viewed individually or 
collectively, the various and sometimes paradoxical justifications discovered by writers 
for the introduction of legislation of this kind arc nothing but a means to certain 
significant ends -to reduce and also regulate, as far as possible, the incidence of industrial 
conflict In 1894, conciliation and compulsory arbitration was intended to avert what one 
member of the then Legislative Council described variously as "actual", "civil" and 
"labour" war (NZ Parliamentary Debates, 1894, p.3). In 1973, the law was intended to 
"bring to an end the unnecessary and continuing frustrdtions that we have suffered through 
needless strikes" (NZ Parliamentary Debates, 1973, p.2768). This justification for 
reform of the law did not change in 1986 (NZ Parliamentary Debates, 1987(a), pp.6429-
6430). 
While the policy justification of collective labour legislation in New Zealand has 
remained the reduction and regulation of industrial conflict, some of the means of achiev-
ing this have varied from epoch to epoch. The changes which have so far characterised 
the role of the authoritative third-party court in particular have been studied by Vranken 
and Hince (1988, pp. l08-113), and we shall not do the same here. Instead we will 
proceed lD determine how the "worker" was intended by the law-makers to play a part in 
the overriding quest to reduce and regulate industrial conflict. 
Vranken and Hince observe that the individual worker's role has not been recognised as 
capable of making a significant contribution to the achievement of the broad purposes of 
industrial conflict regulation. The emphasis in all of the laws has been on "collec-
tivities" - trade unions - and how to make these effective and responsible entities capable 
of committing them ideologically to the system. The motto, therefore, must have been 
this: seck ye first effective and responsible trade unions and the interest of the individual 
worker shall be protected. Writing about the IC&A Act, Vranken and Hince note that 
[T]he deduction [is] that the ... Act, and the activity of the Court, regardless of 
the original prime intent, had resulted in a centrality of registered organisa-
tions, and that such organisations were prescribed a role in the arbitral process. 
We can therefore assert that the emphasis was on the needs of the collective and 
that the protection of the individual by the conciliation and arbitration law and 
I 
3 "Sweating" is the euphemistic expression for atrocious exploitation of labour, particularly 
that of females and children. 
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the Labour Court was to be bro ught through the protection of the collective 
(p. l11) . 
A slight variation appears in this theme later when the co-authors observe that "the 
system was designed to benefit the whole community, individual rights were to be 
protected via the collective" (p.l11). This, according to the co-authors, remained the 
philosophy up to 1968. Legislative amendment in 1970, (s 179 (1) IC&A Act) and a 
major revision in 1973 (IR Act) introduced what is now known as the personal grievance 
procedures, under which the Court was given an expanded jurisdiction to hear and deter-
mine workplace conflicts between employers and employees. One would have expected 
this innovation to have resulted in a de-emphasisation of the interests or role of the 
collective in the industrial relations system. This was, however, not the case. "In 
general II, observe Vranken and H ince (p.l17), II workers could not be parties to 
proceedings under the IR Act and a union could only represent those who were eligible to 
join it under its existing membership rule". As Judge William son once held: 
As a broad general rule, an individual worker has no party status before this 
court under the Industnal Relations Act. He may enforce various rights in the 
civil cou rls, but, generally speaking, his remedies in this court are available 
only at the su1t of his un10n or an Inspector of Awards (Allfrey , [1983] ACJ 
131 t 134 ). 
The rationale for th1s "broad general rule" was stated by the learned judge as giving 
unions the right to determine whether a grievance had substance which warranted 
ventilation. The only circumstance in which an individual worker could proceed to the 
court was where the union had failed to act, or to act promptly to bring the grievance to 
resolution. It goes without saying that a non-union member had no right to invoke the 
personal grievance procedures under the IR Act. 
Reviston of the law in 1987 did nothing to reduce the innuence of the collective in 
industrial disputes. Rather, the law-makers reiterated the desire to "promote the formation 
of more effecuve and accountable workers' unions and employers' organisations" (NZ 
Parliamentary Debates, 1987(a), p.6426). The emphasis was on "groups of workerstl 
rather than the individual worker. Unions were given the right to detennine their own 
objects and membership rules, subjec t only to controls to promote membership participa-
tion, democracy and accountable management. Again, access to the personal grievance 
procedures became the property of the union. The emphasis here was on union 
membership. A slight sh1 ft occurred: an individual worker not covered by an award could 
nevertheless rcqu ire the union to invoke the personal grievance procedure on his or her 
behalf, provided the worker jomed the union before the submi ssion of the grievance. An 
individual worker, could however, by-pass the unton, but only in a limited number of 
circumstances. Again, the law-makers' hope was that the individual 's interest should be 
protected through that of effecll ve and responsible unions. In so far as this was true, 
there is a considerable substance of truth in some parliamentary criticisms of the Labour 
Relations Bill that the Bill was too weighted m favour of trade unions and discriminated 
against the Interests of indtviduaJ workers in personal grievance claims. A s such the Bill 
denied to individual workers certain fundamental human rights (NZ Parliamentary 
Debates, 1987(b), pp.8802, 8924 ). 
It is against this background that the definiti on of "worker " in the LR Act must be 
examined. It would appear that because the rauonale had remained the desire to establish 
effecti ve and responsible un1ons as a panacea for the mcreas ing incidence of largely un-
regulated industrial disputes, the law-makers dtd not bother themselves with the delicate 
question of qual1 fication requiremenL'i for trade un1on membership. Unions were given 
the right to formulate thctr own membership rules so long as these promoted democratic 
participation and accoun Lable organ isauon. 
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While this is hardly the place to go into a detailed discussion of union membership 
rules, it is, nevertheless, important to observe that the provisions of the LR Act raise a 
very strong presumption in favour of wider, rather than more restricted, trade union 
membership. Because this is so, the Act has refrained from specifying any eligibility 
qualifications for trade union members except perhaps the requirement that a potential 
trade union member must be a person engaged to work, or a person who intends to work. 
Two objects of the union membership provisions in the Act typify this presumption. 
Section 58( a) of the Act provides that: 
While unions may provide for a wider membership. all persons working who 
fall within the coverage of a union membership rule have a right to join that 
union [emphasis added]. 
Under Section 58(e), moreover, an exemption from union membership may only be 
sought on the grounds of conscience or other deeply held personal conviction. Section 60 
of the Act complements these provisions by stating that: 
Subject to the provisions of this Act, every person who, by virtue of that 
person's work or intended work, is within the coverage of the membership rule 
of a union shall be entitled to be admitted to membership of the union and on 
application the union shall admit such a person to membership; and so far as the 
rules of any union are inconsistent with the provisions of this section they 
shall be null and void [emphasis added]. 
The italicised words in these provisions clearly indicate the intention of Parliament to 
extend the protections afforded under the Act to a variety of working people regardless of 
the contractual basis of their employment. The intent of the law-makers was to reduce 
and regulate industrial conflict through effective and responsible trade unions. The 
effectiveness of unions will derive from among other things, the numerical strength of 
their membership which, in tum, will generate sufficient resources, at both the personnel 
and financial levels, to enable unions to discharge their functions more efficiently and 
effectively. There must have been other justifications for expanding rather than 
restricting union membership: industrial conflict whether started by "employees" or 
"servantsn properly so-called, or by independent contractors, are disruptive of any 
industrial or economic production process. The creation of effective trade unions with 
tentacles stretched into many areas of the industrial production sector, will canalise most, 
if not all, industrial conflict into the rationalised system. The consequence of this will 
be increased specialisation, hence, increased efficiency, in the handling of a greater 
proportion of industrial conflict within the system. 
It should now be clear that L~e Labour Court and its predecessors have paid little or no 
auention to the policy justifications behind collective labour legislation of this country 
in their efforts to determine the key question of who is a "worker" for the purposes of the 
Act. The law-makers were not interested in the question of whether a person works or 
intends to work as a "servant" or an independent contractor. Rather the interest was in the 
person as a potential participant in industrial conflict. Insofar as the person's work or 
intended work, makes him or her a potential industrial disputant, he or she will become 
subjected to the control of a trade union; the latter will then define and protect his or her 
interests. The absolute discretion conferred on unions to formulate and implement 
membership rules was intended to be exercised in a way which will bring as many 
working people as possible, regardless of the contractual basis of their employment, 
under the umbrella of the national industrial conflict process (Clark and Wedderburn, 
1983, p.145). The lesson which emerges from the understanding provided in this section 
is that it is union membership rules which make a person a "worker" for the purposes of 
the Act These rules are what industrial tribunals in New Zealand should be scrutinising. 
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The paradox in industrial tribunals' decisions 
In one class of cases decided under the IR Act, the Labour Court and its predecessors 
were willing to recognise the right of unions to determine who to admit to membership; 
yet in another c~ass decided under the same Act they were unprepared to declare a person a 
"worker" for the purposes of the Act, although a union had treated the person as its 
member. In Greenwood v Keith Galloway Ltd ([ 1982] ACJ 41, 43) a personal grievance 
dispute, the Arbitration Court held obiter that 
We acknowledge too, that there is an argument that since the right to take 
personal grievance proceedings is vested in the union, the union should have 
the right to say who should be regarded as its member for the purpose of taking 
those proceedings. 
This dictum was adopted and applied to the facts of Canterbury Clerical Workers IUW 
v Brady ([1986] ACJ 98, 102) where the same court held that 
if a union is prepared to accept ... a person under the age of eighteen years, who 
is not obliged to become a member of the union, but nonetheless has been 
'under its wing' as a worker covered by the award which is serviced and applied 
by that union, then it should be entitled to do so. 
An examination of 2 other cases will disclose the unwillingness of industrial tribunals 
to accept union membership rules as determinative of the question who is a "worker" for 
the purposes of the Act. In Agricultural Pilots' Assoc of NZ IUW v The Southland 
Aerial Co-operative Society Ltd, ([ 1985] ACJ 330), the grievant, whose initial contract 
of service with the society was terminated, nevertheless held himself available to fly the 
society's planes under a different arrangemenL He had remained a member of the union 
and attended all its annual general meetings. His employment was later terminated. The 
court held that although the factor of his continued membership of the union pointed to 
the existence of an employer-employee relationship, it could not attract any weight apart 
from the one that it provided him with occasions for meeting other pilots in a social 
interaction context. Accordingly, the Court denied him a "worker" status under the Act. 
The effect of this decision and many others is to deny to a union the right to say who 
should be regarded as i L') member. 
Similarly, in NZ h'orkers IUW v Wilkins ([ 1986] ACJ 227) where the relevant award 
covered the work of the grievan t, the Court nevertheless held that the grievant was not a 
.. worker" since he worked under a con tract for services and not one of service. Chief 
Judge Hom went further to observe in his judgment that: 
We comment there arc and have been for many years items in successive awards 
which purport to extend the terms of awards to persons not bound in a master 
and servant relationship. There are deficiencies in this award which should be 
looked into (p.279). 
It is submitted, in the light of what has been sa id so far, that the Court was not 
correct in this observation because the provisions of the Act did not restrict coverage of 
the terms of awards to the work of .. servants". The IR Act, hke the LR Act, was intended 
to be cons trued broadly so as to include as many working people as possible within its 
prov isions. Such an interpretation would have been consistent with at least judicial 
authority in the United Kingdom that to qualify as a .. worker" the test is whether a person 
has undertaken to perform "personally'' any work in a contractual context (Broadbent v 
Crisp [1974] ICR 248; WGGB v BBC [1974] ICR 234). It is further submiued that for 
the purposes of the LR Act, it is a union, and not the Court, which is competent to make 
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a person engaged or employed to do any work for hire or reward, or a person intending to 





whether a union's membership rules arc inconsistent with the provisions of the 
Act; 
whether the union or the person so admitted as a member has met the criteria and 
procedure prescribed by the union's rules relating to admission to membership; 
whether the person so admitted as a member of the union was employed, or has 
intended to do any work for hire or reward; and 
whether the persons work or intended work is covered by the union's coverage 
rules. 
The determination of the thira issue will not necessarily involve the determination of 
the issue of whether the person engaged was engaged as an "employee", or a "servant" or 
an independent contractor; or whether the person intends to work in any of the forgoing 
capacities. It will only become a live issue where a union's membership rule requires so. 
The Court's role is misconceived when it purports to decide any question outside those 4. 
It is in the light of this approach that Judge Palmer's Judgment in 2 recent cases 
(Denford, 1989, CLC 70/89; and Tan, 1989, CLC 67/89) must be commended as 
seminal. 
4. Conclusion 
The understanding provided in this article has revealed one significant development in 
the law and practice of industrial relations in New Zealand, namely, an incorrect 
interpretation of the term "worker" in the LR Act and other enactments under which 
industrial tribunals have exercised their specialist jurisdictions. This development has 
occurred because of 2 main reasons. First, industrial tribunals have read into the clear 
statutory definitions of the term, "a contract of service," words which the definitions do 
not contain. Furthermore, they have limited the construction of the term to a person who 
works or worked under a contract of service. This is contrary to the elementary and 
fundamental rule of statutory construction that words in a statute should be given their 
ordinary meaning unless the result would lead to absurdity, irrationality, hardship, 
injustice, inconsistency, etc. New Zealand industrial tribunals have not shown that any 
of these results are likely to arise if the words of the statutory definitions of the term are 
given their ordinary or plain meanings. Second, industrial tribunals have failed to allow 
the policy considerations behind the enactments to influence the meaning which they 
have given the term. This approach directly contradicts section 5U) of the Acts 
Interpretation Act 1924. 
Dissatisfaction with this development is justifiable on a number of grounds. First, 
given that the current Labour Court, in particular, can only assume its specialist 
jurisdiction upon a finding that a party before it is a "worker" or a representative of a 
"worker" or a group of "workers", any meaning which the Court decides to give the term 
will necessarily have consequences for the size of the working population which can 
benefit from the exercise of the Court's jurisdiction. It is submitted that the development 
identified in this article has shrunk, rather than enlarged, the size of the working class that 
has so far benefited from the specialist jurisdiction and protection of our industrial 
tribunals. Social policy does not support this development. 
Second, the institutional specialisation which is rapidly taking place in the industrial 
relations system means that other institutions or courts are being increasingly deprived of 
the competence to determine the question "who is a worker?" for the purposes of 
industrial disputation under the LR Act and other enactments. One inevitable 
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consequence of institutional specialization is the increased bureaucratisation and 
differentiation of industrial disputes. Another is that decisions of the specialist 
institution will become less and less subject to review by, or appeal to, other courts or 
tribunals in society. A limited system of reviews and appeals exist under the LR Act It 
would appear, however, that so far, these have not affected decisions of our industrial 
tribunals in this crucial area. On the issue of appeals in particular, Section 312 of the 
LR Act will regulate the matter. The section provides that: 
(1) Where any party to any proceedings under this Act is dissatisfied with any 
decision of the Labour Court ... as being erroneous in point of law, that party 
may appeal to the Court of Appeal by way of case stated for the opinion of that 
Court on a question of law only. 
Although this right of appeal exists, its exercise has been restricted to decisions of the 
Labour Court on points of law. It is submitted that even if this provision can be invoked 
in relauon to the decisions of the Labour Court on the question "who is a worker?", it 
can only be invoked in a marginal number of cases. This is so because the Court and its 
predecessors have largely treated the application of their current crop, :.he "mixed" (or 
"mullipleff) and If totality" tests of a contract of service as a matter of fact rather than as a 
matter of law (Szakats, 1988, pp.26-31). 
While there arc direct statements in some of the judgments to this effect, the industrial 
tribunals have also heJd that these tests represent the "common sense approach of the 
reasonable person" (sec e.g. NZ Carpenters, etc, IUW v Construction Development Ltd 
1989, CLC 16/89). This being the case, it is further submitted that decisions on the 
question are unlikely to be successful unless an appellant can show that a test was 
incorrectly interprcted4 , or that a particular ccnclusion of the Labour Court i~ perverse. or 
is one that cannot be justified Oli the basis of the evidence presented in the case5. There 
can be no doubt, therefore, that successful appeals on the question will be not only as 
scarce as dog's tears, but completely non-existent. This itself compounds the crisis of 
confiC:ence in the Labour Court's approach to this question. 
The thud and final objection to the Labour Court's determination rf the crucial 
qucstio1 addressed in this article 1s t11at the Court has assumed a jurisdiction which the 
LR Act has not conferred on it. It ts not th~ province of the Coart to m2.ke or unmake a 
"worker" for the purposes of the Act. It rr.ust be re-cmphasised that this competence is 
the property of untons. Wr have already drawn attention to the Cotxt's role in this 
matter. Th~re may be an argument that it was not the legislative intent that all manner 
of worktng people bcnefiL from the prov tsxons of tne LR Act. If indCF'Althis argument 
is sustainabl~, then it is equall) important to tndicate here that it is not the province of 
the Court to fill Jn this lacuna in the Act. Parliament had for reasons best known to 
itself, defined "worker" and "employee" differently in different enactments. '1 he 
jurisdicuon conferred on the Court in tile LR Act is limited to issues concerning the 
"worker", not the "enployee'. If Parliament intended to make L1c "worl:er's" ccmmor. 
law cousin th, "employee", 1t would ha"e done so expressly. If Parliament considers that 
it has created a Frankeinstein monster out of the current "worker", it is Parliament alone 
which is competent to shear the concept of its undesirable quali' ies. The Labour Coun 
si~ould not arrogate to itself the competence to perform this t.ask . There must remain a 
strt(;l separation of powers between the legislature and the jucticiary. 
4 See, e.g., Davis v New England College of Arundel [1977] ICR 6; and Parsons v A J 
Parsons & Sons Ltd [ 1978] ICR 456. 
5 Neale v 1/ereford and Worceste1 Coun1y Council [1986} ICR 471. 483; and Campion v 
Hamworthy Engtneenng Ltd [ 1987] ICR 966, 972-973. 
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